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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION, IN­
JUNCTIVE RELIEF AND NONACQUIESCENCE-Lopez v. Heckler, 104 
S. Ct. 221 (1984). 
PREFACE 
Lopez v. Heckler remains undecided, but the decisional uncer­
tainty only tangentially impacts on this note, which principally concerns 
the inability of large numbers of social security disability claimants to 
secure judicial review of their claim that governmental nonacquiesence 
[in prior circuit court holdings] denies them their constitutional rights. 
The bulk of this note was written in early 1983. Subsequent deci­
sions in Lopez only make minor additions to the discussion in the body 
of the note. The rationale for the decisions listed in the next paragraph, 
therefore, will not be discussed. 
On February 22, 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals affirmed 
much ofthe district court's preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court 
had stayed implementation of the injunction pending adjudication. 
Implementation was again held in abeyance when the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review it. On September 19, 1984, Congress en­
acted guidelines essentially upholding the plaintiffs' eligibility for social 
security benefits. On October 16, 1984, the Supreme Court partially 
affirmed and partially reversed the preliminary injunction. The govern­
ment requested a rehearing and in December, 1984, the Supreme Court 
vacated the injunction and directed the district court to apply the new 
law. As a result, the plaintiffs have received none ofthe injunctive relief 
initially demanded even though many had their benefits restored under 
the new statutory guidelines. 
The Lopezplaintiffs must begin again. Atfirst glance, all the com­
batants' legal thrusts and parries appear moot. Such a characterization 
is inaccurate. Nothing has been decided about the constitutionality of 
nonacquiesence or the availability ofinjunctive relieffor its victims. The 
statute does not prevent the government from employing nonacquiesence 
in the future. The Supreme Court has avoided nonacquiesence and has 
substantially narrowed the availability of injunctive relief through the 
application of complex jurisdictional prerequisites, discussed in detail 
below. In fact, the progress of Lopez to date casts doubt on the ability 
of similarly situated future plaintiffs to gain effective review of their 
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claims. The intricate dance performed by the plaintiffs, the government 
agency, and the courts in Lopez may serve as a blueprint for subsequent 
cases regardless of the final outcome of Lopez v. Heckler. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court's refusal to grant an emergency 
application to vacate a stay of a preliminary injunction ordered by Jus­
tice Rehnquist in Lopez v. Heckler! created a legal tangle of massive 
proportions.2 Unfortunately, thousands of social security disability 
payment recipients whose terminations sparked this struggle,3 many 
with scarce physical and emotional resources and some with even less 
time,4 are enmeshed in this procedural tangle with little hope of a 
speedy remedy. 
In Lopez, twenty named individual and fourteen organizational 
plaintiffs asked for injunctive reliefS on behalf of a nationwide class 
consisting of all those persons who had or might have their disability 
benefits terminated on grounds that they were no longer disabled or 
that their conditions had improved under Title II of the Social Secur­
ity Act. 6 Plaintiffs contended that the continued use of the procedures 
I. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983). Justice Rehnquist subsequently granted this stay 
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 104 S. Ct. 
10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
2. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (issuance of preliminary in­
junction requiring restitution of disability payments), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 
1983), stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983), vacation o/stay denied, 
104 S. Ct. 221 (1983). 
3. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434. 
4. Id. at 1437. 
5. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27. 
6. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 401-31 (1976 & Supp. 1981). Subsections 405(g) and 405(h) state 
in pertinent part: 
(g) Judicial review. Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary 
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in con­
troversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced 
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within 
such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the 
district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff 
resides.... 
(h) Finality of administrative determinations. The findings and decisions of 
the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were par­
ties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be 
reviewed by any person, tribunal or governmental agency except as herein pro­
vided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or em­
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that generated termination was unconstitutional. 7 For the same rea­
son, eighteen named plaintiffs also sought reversal of termination of 
their Title XVI Supplemental Income Disability Benefits. 8 The district 
court certified only a circuit wide class.9 The defendant, Margaret 
Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, estimated that the 
class already contained 72,000 people.lO Those who might be effected 
in the future would further swell the number. I I 
The subsequent legal battle focused on the implementation of the 
preliminary injunction that the plaintiff had sought and won. 12 The 
ployee thereof shall be brought under section 24 of the Judicial Code of the 
United States to recover on any claim arising under this title. 
7. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27. In Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), see 
infra notes 22, 25-30, 36-42 and accompanying text, and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 
1340 (9th Cir. 1981), see infra notes 23, 31-42 and accompanying text, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the Secretary was required to introduce new evidence before a 
person previously declared permanently disabled could have his benefits terminated. Patti, 
669 F.2d at 586-87; Finnegan, 641 F.2d at 1345. The claimants in Lopez, argued that they 
were denied due process when the Secretary terminated them in the face of these rulings 
without submitting new evidence. 713 F.2d at 1434. 
8. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27 n.1. The court found: "Title XVI of the Social Security 
Act created Supplemental Security Income Disability Benefits for persons who are both 
poor and disabled. . . . SSI benefits are paid to eligible poor persons whose income and 
resources fall below a specified level." Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). The key subsections of section 1381 covering procedural requirements read in perti­
nent part: 
(c) Hearing to determine eligibility. . . .; judicial review: 
(1) The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the 
rights of any individual applying for payment under this subchapter. . . . 
(3) The final determination of the Secretary after a hearing under paragraph (1) 
shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the 
same extent as the Secretary's final determinations under section 405 of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
9. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. The text of that portion of the court order granting class wide relief follows: 
4. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is granted as follows: 
The defendants, their agents and employees are enjoined and restrained 
within the Ninth Circuit: 
(a) From failing to follow, implement or accord precedential effect to Finne­
gan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) and Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 
582 (9th Cir. 1982). 
(b) From implementing the nonacquiescence policy contained in Social Se­
curity Rulings Nos. 82-1Oc, 82-49c and 81-6 .... 
(c) In order to accomplish appropriate restoration of disability benefits 
pending resolution of this action, the court orders the defendants to implement 
the following procedure: 
(i) Within sixty (60) days following the date of this order, the defendants 
will notify (a) each class member who had been receiving Supplemental Security 
Income Disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(E), and who was termi­
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Secretary objected to the requirement of the injunction that she con­
tinue paying interim benefits to terminated claimants whose individual 
claims were before the courts. The Secretary appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have the enforcement of that part of 
the injunction stayed while the merits of the entire injunction were 
appealed. 13 The Ninth Circuit refused to stay. 14 Circuit Justice Rehn­
quist, however, stayed the injunction l5 and the Supreme Court then 
denied the plaintiff's request to vacate his stay.16 The case was re­
manded to the appellate court so it could determine if the district 
court's preliminary injunction should be affirmed.17 Because the in­
junction's enforcement was stayed, the termination of all former recip­
ients stood. 
Lopez arose from unusual circumstances. In March of 1981 the 
Social Security Administration changed and accelerated the review 
procedures by which a recipient's continuing eligibility for disability 
benefits was determined. IS As a result, the number of terminations bal­
nated from such benefits after August 25, 1980, and (b) all other persons who 
have been terminated from either Title II social security disability insurance or 
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Disability after August 30, 1981, for the 
purported reason that his or her disability had ceased, whether or not such person 
has appealed, that: 
Such person may apply for reinstatement of benefits if he or she believes that 
his or her medical condition has not improved following the granting of disability 
benefits. 
(ii) Upon receiving such application, the defendants forthwith reinstate and 
pay benefits in the monthly amounts such person would have been receiving had 
his or her benefits not been interrupted. 
(iii) Following such reinstatement, if the defendants or their agents or em­
ployees conduct a disability investigation or other screening of such person they 
will apply the standards set forth in Patti v. Schweiker and Finnegan v. Matthews 
and, if they conclude that such person's medical condition has improved and he 
or she is no longer disabled, they will identify the evidence relied upon to reach 
that conclusion. 
(iv) Following such review, persons who are notified of an initial determina­
tion that their benefits shall cease shall be given an opportunity to contest the 
determination and pending such review, they shall continue to receive aid as pro­
vided in current laws and regulations. 
Id. at 32. 
13. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434. 
14. Id. at 1435. 
15. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 16 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
16. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. 221, 225 (1983). This decision of the entire Court should not be 
confused with the decision Circuit Justice Rehnquist made in the same case one month 
earlier. See supra note 16. 
17. Id. 
18. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1433-34. Prior to 1982, those judged permanently disabled 
could not be terminated without the presentation of new evidence that their medical condi­
tion had substantially improved. The court of appeals adhered to this rule in Patti v. 
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looned from 98,000 in fiscal year 1981 to over 195,000 in fiscal year 
1982.19 The Lopez plaintiffs claimed the doubling of terminations was 
the fruit of new procedures that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had already found illegal.2° The plaintiffs maintained that their 
terminations violated the holdings of Patti v. Schweiker21 and Finne­
gan v. Matthews22 that, "before Social Security Disability Benefits 
[could] be terminated on the ground that the recipient [was] no longer 
disabled, the Secretary must introduce evidence that the recipient's 
medical condition [had] improved. "23 
In Patti an administrative law judge reversed a 1978 determina­
tion that a recipient was no longer disabled.24 In 1979, however, the 
agency again terminated the plaintiff without introducing new facts.2s 
A district court judge upheld the second termination.26 The court of 
appeals reversed, finding that "a prior ruling of disability can give rise 
to a presumption that the disability still exists. "27 While the presump­
tion did not shift the burden of proof, the Secretary "was required to 
'meet or rebut' [it] with evidence that the [plaintiff's] condition had 
improved in the interim."28 The court restored the plaintiff's benefits 
because the Secretary presented no such evidence.29 In Finnegan, the 
plaintiff had entered the federal Supplemental Security Income pro­
gram in 1974 when the California program was integrated with the 
national one.30 A grandfather clause in the federal takeover agreement 
raised the presumption that former recipients under the state program 
would automatically qualify for federal benefits.31 The circuit court 
reversed32 a district court affirmance of the secretary's termination of 
Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th 
Cir. 1981). Once the Secretary directed her administrative law judges to ignore these rules, 
see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text, the Social Security Administration was free to 
terminate recipients without amassing new evidence. This enabled the agency to accelerate 
the pace of terminations. 
19. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434. 
20. Id. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
21. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982). 
22. 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). 
23. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434 (citing Patti, 669 F.2d at 587; Finnegan, 641 F.2d at 
1345). 
24. 669 F.2d at 583. 
25. Id. at 584. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 586. 
28. Id. at 587. 
29. Id. 
30. 641 F.2d at 1342-43. 
31. 641 F.2d at 1342. 
32. Id. 
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the plaintitrs benefits,33 holding that "benefits to a grandfatheree must 
not be terminated absent proof of a material improvement in his medi­
cal condition."34 
The court reinstated Ms. Patti's and Mr. Finnegan's benefits35 but 
the Secretary refused to acquiesce in the appellate courts legal rule 
created by the holdings in Patti and Finnegan that recipients were pre­
sumed disabled and could not be terminated prior to the presentation 
of evidence that their conditions had improved.36 The Secretary stated 
that the holding applied only to the plaintiffs before the court in Patti 
and FinneganY Regardless of these decisions the Secretary would 
continue to use accelerated screening procedures and new rules of evi­
dence.38 In response to Patti, the Social Security Administration ruled 
that "even if current medical or other evidence does not show 'medical 
improvement' . . . a non grandfathered SSI [Supplemental Security 
Income] recipient is subject to cessation if such evidence shows that 
the recipient is able to engage in substantial gainful activity."39 After 
Finnegan, a similar ruling insured that those accepted into the federal 
program who had previously been in the state program would receive 
the same treatment.40 Both rulings reflected a previously articulated 
Social Security Administration policy that "[w]here the evidence ob­
tained at the time of a continuing disability investigation (COl) estab­
lishes that the individual is not currently disabled . . . a finding of 
cessation is appropriate. It will not be necessary to determine whether 
or how much the individual's condition has medically improved since 
the prior favorable determination."41 Thus, the Administration did 
not apply the standards mandated by Patti and Finnegan to other re­
cipients during a COL This was the nonacquiescence policy that the 
plaintiffs in Lopez said denied them due process under the fifth amend­
ment of the United States Constitution and violated the separation of 
powers mandated by Article Three of the United States Constitu­
tion.42 The district court's determination in that case, that nonacquies­
33. Id. at 1347. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; Patti, 669 F.2d at 587. 
36. Patti v. Schweiker, SSR 82-49c (Oct. 1982); Finnegan v. Matthews, SSR 82-1Oc 
(Jan. 1982). In these rulings, the Secretary directed her administrative law judges not to 
acquiescence in the Ninth Circuit holdings. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Patti v. Schweiker, SSR 82-49c (Oct. 1982). 
40. Finnegan v. Mathews, SSR 82-1Oc (Jan. 1982). 
41. Continuance or Cessation of Disability or Blindness, SSR 81-6 (Cum. ed. 1981). 
42. 713 F.2d at 1434. 
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cence was unlawful, provided the starting point for its grant of a 
preliminary injunction ordering the Secretary to conform her disabil­
ity determinations to the standards set in Patti and Finnegan.43 
The claim for classwide injunctive relief was central to the plain­
tiffs effort to defeat the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence. Since a 
class action places all recipients who have been terminated in a single 
suit, the injunctive relief sought would permit all class members to 
continue to col1ect benefits while their eligibility claim was redeter­
mined.44 The district court had to determine, however, whether its 
jurisdiction extended to the claims of the class and permitted a class­
wide injunctive remedy.45 
The Supreme Court's holding in Weinberger v. Salji46 is the mod­
ern point of departure for an evaluation of these issues,47 which in­
clude "the jurisdiction of a federal district court to entertain such 
challenges [to social security administration policies, practices and eli­
gibility decisions] and the related question of exhaustion of adminis­
trative remedies; . . . the propriety of class actions and . . . 
availability of injunctive ... relief."48 Analysis of these issues is im­
portant because Salji can be read to impede judicial review of constitu­
tional issues such as nonacquiescence. What follows is a preliminary 
analysis of the Salji factors. 
A. Jurisdiction 
In Salji, a widow challenged on equal protection grounds a Social 
Security Insurance Benefits statute that limited payments to the survi­
vors of marriages that lasted more than nine months.49 The Supreme 
Court reversed a three judge district court finding that federal question 
jurisdiction could be asserted because of the constitutional nature of 
43. Id. 
44. See supra note 12. 
45. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30-31. 
46. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
47. Goldstein, The Procedural Impact of Weinberger v. Salfi Revisited, 31 DE PAUL 
L. REV. 721, 723 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Salfi Revisited]. 
48. Id. The first two points could be modified further. The source of a court's juris­
diction as well. as whether it has jurisdiction is important because various jurisdictional 
statutes carry significant limitations. For instance, 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), the jurisdic­
tional subsection of Title II of the Social Security Act, generally only allows a federal dis­
trict court to assert jurisdiction over claims in which plaintiffs have exhausted their 
administrative remedies. Social Security Act § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970). In a simi­
lar fashion, the scope as well as the propriety of the class action is of crucial significance. 
49. 422 U.S. at 755-56. The plaintiff, who had been married almost six months when 
her husband died, see 422 U.S. at 753, challenged the constitutionality of the nine month 
requirement. Id. at 755-56. 
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the claim. 50 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the 
Social Security Act's jurisdictional sectionSl barred the assumption of 
federal question jurisdiction. 52 If the administrative exhaustion re­
quirement of the act were satisfied, however, a federal district court 
could assert jurisdiction over the claims of individually named benefi­
ciaries who met all the other requirements of the act.53 Under Sa/fi, 
then, if individuals contested a Social Security Administration deter­
mination, they could not bring a claim to court before the agency's 
mechanisms for settling such disputes had been fully utilized. 
Administrative exhaustion occurs whenever the Secretary makes 
a "final decision. "54 Language in the Sa/fi decision indicated that the 
50. Id. at 756-61. 28 U.S.C. section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction 
over claims arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The court 
reasoned that in this case, however, jurisdiction was controlled by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
(1970), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (Supp. II 1976). At the time of the Sa/fi decision, 
the third sentence of this section of the statute read: "No action against the United States, 
the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under sections 41 of title 
28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h)(1970). 
51. 	 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1983). 
52. 	 Sa/fi, 422 U.S. at 756-57. 
53. Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1981). This 
subsection reads in part: "Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made 
after a hearing to which he is a party. . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days." Id. 
54. 	 Id. In order to exhaust administrative remedies a claimant who has been termi­
nated 	normally takes the following steps: 
Title 20 - Employees' Benefits Chapter III - Social Security Administration 
(I) Initial determination. This is a determination we make about your entitle­
ment or your continuing entitlement to benefits or about any other matter, as 
discussed in § 404.902, that gives you a right to further review. 
(2) Reconsideration. If you are dissatisfied with an initial determination, you 
may ask us to reconsider it. Generally, you must request a reconsideration before 
you may request a hearing. 
(3) Hearing. If you are dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination, you 
may request a hearing before an administrative law judge. 
(4) Appeals Council review. If you are dissatisfied with the decision of the ad­
ministrative law judge, you may request that the Appeals Council review the 
decision. 
(5) Federal court review. When you have completed the steps of the administra­
tive review process listed in paragraphs (a)(I) through (a)(4) of this section, we 
will have made our final decision. If you are dissatisfied with our final decision, 
you may request judicial review by filing an action in a Federal district court. 
(6) Expedited appeals process. At some time after your initial determination has 
been reviewed, if you have no dispute with our findings of fact and our application 
and interpretation of the controlling laws, but you believe that a part of the law is 
unconstitutional, you may use the expedited appeals process. This process per­
mits you to go directly to a Federal district court so that the constitutional issue 
may be resolved. 
(b) Nature of the administrative review process. In making a determination or 
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Secretary, not the protesting claimant, determined when a final deci­
sion had been made. 55 Thus, unless the Secretary waived the exhaus­
tion requirement, claimants were apparently required to pursue all 
administrative remedies before taking the case to district court. The 
Court, however, soon delineated circumstances when the requirement 
would not be literally applied. In Mathews v. Eldridge,56 the Court 
subdivided the exhaustion requirement into waivable and non-waiv­
able parts. 57 In deciding if it had jurisdiction over a claim, a court 
could not waive the requirement that a claimant present a request for 
benefits. 58 The final decision requirement could be waived if the claim­
ant mounted a constitutional challenge to the procedures used by the 
agency and if additional administrative decisions would not provide an 
adequate remedy. 59 Thus, if the constitutionality of the process itself 
were challenged a plaintiff could take a claim to federal court after 
benefits had been requested but before the Secretary had rendered a 
final decision. The court would still have to ascertain whether a claim­
ant was placing the constitutionality of the process in question or 
merely making a claim for benefits. 60 
The Court's clarification of these jurisdictional guidelines in El­
dridge is essential to the Lopez action because not all named plaintiffs, 
let alone all the class members, had exhausted their administrative 
remedies. 61 Furthermore, if the plaintiffs in Lopez were forced to ex­
haust their administrative remedies, they could never challenge the 
Administration's policy of nonacquiescence. The district court would 
determine the eligibility for social security benefits, relying presumably 
on Patti and Finnegan. Having fully exhausted the Secretary's pro­
ceedings and having received a decision reversing the result of those 
procedures, however, their attack on the procedures themselves would 
decision in your case, we conduct the administrative review process in an infor­
mal, nonadversary manner. In each step of the review process, you may present 
any information you feel is helpful to your case. We will consider it and all the 
information in our records. You may present the information yourself or have 
someone represent you, including an attorney. If you are dissatisfied with our 
decision in the review process, but do not take the next step within the stated time 
period, you will lose your right to further administrative review and your right to 
judicial review, unless you can show us that there was good cause for your failure 
to make a timely request for review. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1983). 
55. Sa/fi, 422 U.S. at 763-64. 
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
57. Id. at 328. 
58. Id. 
59. /d. at 330-32. 
60. Id. 
61. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439. 
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be moot.62 
Justice Rehnquist, however, found that the teaching of Sa/fi and 
Eldridge required staying the district court's injunction in Lopez be­
cause it "cover[ed] individuals who ... never questioned the initial 
determination that they [had] ceased to be disabled. "63 The Lopez 
plaintiffs, however, took action equivalent to that taken by the plain­
tiffs in Eldridge and in the latter case the Supreme Court found that 
the action satisfied the nonwaivable claim for benefits requirement. 64 
In Mathews v. Diaz6S the Supreme Court arguably created an ad­
ditional ground for waiving the final decision requirement.66 Unlike 
Eldridge, Diaz challenged the constitutionality of the statute on which 
the Secretary based a decision, not the procedure she employed to im­
plement the law.67 The majority in Diaz appeared to excuse exhaustion 
when exhuastion was futile: If futile, "[the] element may be deemed 
waived even over the Secretary's objection."68 A court would rule on 
the constitutionality of a statute regardless of the Secretary's waiver of 
exhuastion. If the Diaz rule were not also applied when a constitu­
tional challenge to the manner in which the Secretary implemented a 
constitutional statute was mounted, a plaintiff would be forced to pur­
sue futile administrative actions. Thus the Secretary's nonacquiescence 
guaranteed that no matter how many times a recipient attacked the 
procedure, it would still be employed to deny benefits to all future 
claimants until they,too, mounted a similar challenge.69 The futility of 
further administrative appeals pertaining to those procedures under 
those circumstances is readily apparent. When plaintiffs exhaust their 
administrative remedies and pursue the claim in federal district court, 
the court will never rule on those procedures because by that time the 
claim rather than the procedures themselves will be before the court. 
Justice Rehnquist did not even consider Diaz when he granted the stay 
62. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 452 U.S. 1308 (1983), the Court refused to rule 
on the constitutionality of the Los Angeles Police Department's standard procedure of 
subduing individuals with choke holds because the plaintiff no longer had standing to ob­
ject to those procedures once he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 1309. 
63. Heckler v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 14. The Court in Eldridge found that "Eldridge's 
constitutional challenge [was] entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement. 
Moreover, there is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constitutional claim as­
serted here and that raised in Sa/ji." Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-31. 
64. Salfi Revisited, supra note 48 at 738 & n.94. 
65. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
66. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 76. 
67: Id. at 70-71. 
68. Id. at 75-77. 
69. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439. 
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in LopezJo 
B. Class Action 
Salji was a class action.71 The Supreme Court stated that because 
the complaint did not allege that all class members had filed a claim 
with the Secretary, the class did not "satisfy the requirements for juris­
diction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)."72 The unequivocal language cre­
ated the impression class relief was impossible under 405(g).73 The 
Court in Califano v. Yamasakf'4 shifted direction and allowed a class 
action if all class members had satisfied the nonwaivable jurisdictional 
requirement.7s 
C. Injunctive Relief 
Yamasaki also provided Social Security class action claimants 
with the possibility of the injunctive relief that the Salji court appar­
ently withheld.76 In Salji, Justice Rehnquist noted that section 405(g) 
"contains no suggestion that a reviewing court is empowered to enter 
an injunctive decree whose operation reaches beyond the particular 
applicant before the court."77 Justice Blackmun, however, speaking 
for the majority in Yamasaki, found injunctive relief available unless 
"the clearest command to the contrary from Congress" existed.78 Af­
ter Yamasaki, congressional silence could no longer be used to deny 
injunctive relief. Language in Yamasaki particularly applies to the cir­
cumstances in Lopez: "In class actions, an injunction may be necessary 
to protect the interest of absent class members and to prevent repeti­
tive litigatioh. "79 One purpose of the Lopez class action was to protect 
70. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
71. 422 U.S. at 755. 
72. Id. at 764. The U.S. Code section cited by the Court requires, in part, that "[a]ny 
individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a 
civil action." Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42 U.S.c. § 405(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
73. Salft Revisited, supra note 48, at 729. 
74. 442 U.S. 682 (1979). In this case, a district court had certified a nationwide class 
of recipients. Id. at 688. Those recipients claimed that the Secretary violated the due pro­
cess clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2, by not holding predetermination hearings before he attempted to recoup alleged 
overpayments to them. Id. 
75. Id. at 701. 
76. 442 U.S. at 763 n.3. 
77. 442 U.S. at 705. 
78. Id. 
79. See Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27. 
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disabled class members unlikely to assert their own claims;80 another 
was to avoid repeated litigation concerning the legality of termination 
procedures that had already been decided in Patti and Finnegan. 81 Jus­
tice Rehnquist also ignored Yamasaki when he stayed the implementa­
tion of the injunction in Lopez. 
II. THE LOPEZ INJUNCTION AND ITS AFfERMATH 
A. The District Court Decision 
The district court found that the plaintiffs easily satisfied the fac­
tual requirements for granting a preliminary injunction as articulated 
by the court of appeals in Beltran v. Meyers: 82 "[T]he moving party 
must demonstrate 'either a combination of probable success on the 
merits' and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious ques­
tions are raised and the balance of hardship tips sharply in the moving 
party's favor."83 The trial court in Lopez found that the plaintiffs were 
likely to succeed on the merits because the Secretary's nonacquies­
cence violated the judiciary's power "to say what the law is. . . [and 
to] apply the rule to particular cases." 84 The district court disap­
proved of the Secretary's stance: "[F]or the Secretary to make a gen­
eral assertion that a decision of the Court of Appeals is not to be 
followed because she disagrees with it is to operate outside the law."8s 
The plaintiff's injury in Lopez might have been irreparable. 
If such a claimant has the determination and the financial and 
physical strength and lives long enough to make it through the ad­
ministrative process, he can turn to the courts and ultimately expect 
them to apply the law as announced in Patti and Finnegan. If ex­
haustion overtakes him and he falls somewhere along the road lead­
ing to such ultimate relief, the nonacquiescence and the resulting 
termination stands. 86 
For these reasons the balance of hardship tipped "sharply" in the 
plaintiffs' favor: 87 "The record shows that some who have unexpect­
edly lost benefits have already suffered deprivation. . . or even death 
from the very disabilities that the Secretary deemed them not to 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 29. 
82. 677 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1982). 
83. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F. 2d 1317, 1320 (9th 
Cir. 1982». 
84. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803». 
85. Id. at 30. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 29. 
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have."88 No judge disputed this finding of the district court although 
some failed to reach the question. Further, the judge found that the 
failure of the Secretary to follow established judicial precedent 
presented a serious legal question of denial of due process.89 Thus, the 
plaintiffs had satisfied the Beltran alternatives. 
The court found that the case met the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure class action guidelines.90 It limited the class to the circuit, how­
ever, based on its belief that the courts of other circuits would be 
better equipped to determine the legality of the Secretary's nonacqui­
escence within their circuits.91 The court did not address possible pre­
clusion by Salfi of classwide relief and did not confront the barriers 
that Salfi may have raised to injunctive remedies. 
The district court treated jurisdiction cursorily: "[T]he [Salfi] 
Court noted that formal exhaustion was not required . . . once the 
Secretary 'has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutional­
ity of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdic­
tion to determine.' "92 The judge, however, neglected the distinction 
between the procedural constitutional claim made against the manner 
in which the Secretary implemented a constitutional statute in Lopez 
and the substantive constitutional attack on the law made in Salfi and 
Diaz. He further noted that the court of appeals in Ringer v. 
Schweiker 93 applied the Salfi exception when the Secretary's ruling 
"makes the result of that process 'both preordained and immuta­
88. 	 Id. at 30. 
89. 	 Id. 
90. 	 Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30-31. The court stated: 
This court now finds that this group fulfills the requirements for class certifi­
cation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). . . . The common constitu­
tional challenge to the policy of nonacquiescence is a legal claim shared by all 
class members. The class representatives' claims are typical of those of the class 
since they stem from the same course of conduct, again the nonacquiescence, and 
pose the same constitutional challenge thereto. The representatives are adequate 
because they have no interests antagonistic to the class members and seek the 
identical relief sought for the class. Moreover, counsel for these representatives 
are able and experienced in protecting the interests of the poor. 
The proposed Ninth Circuit class also fulfills the requirement of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 
Id. 
91. Id. at 31. 
92. Id. at 29 (quoting Salfi v. Weinberger, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975». 
93. 697 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2013 (1984). This reversal, a 
possibility noted by Justice Rehnquist when he first granted the temporary stay, Lopez, 104 
S.Ct. at 14 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983), destroys this argument, see infra note 169. 
The distinction between Ringer and Eldridge, however, remains critical. See infra note 110 
and accompanying text. 
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ble.' "94 The district court failed to recognize, however, that the circuit 
court's analysis in Ringer flowed from the Court's consideration in El­
dridge of the constitutionality of a procedure, not from the examina­
tion of the constitutionality of the statute in Sa/fi. The trial court 
concluded that any further recourse to administrative procedures at­
tacking nonacquiescence would prove futile95 because the Secretary 
had admitted that the administrative law judges had been directed to 
ignore the Patti and Finnegan guidelines. 
B. 	 The Court ofAppeals Denial of the Secretary's Application for a 
Stay 
The district court focused primarily on nonacquiescence. The 
Supreme Court, however, had not directly confronted nonacquies­
cence in the twentieth century.96 While a number of appellate courts 
had soundly condemned nonacquiescence,97 the Supreme Court's si­
lence might have bespoken a reluctance to decide the issue. Perhaps 
sensing this possibility the court of appeals affirmed the implementa­
tion of the injunction but focused on the murky jurisdiction, class ac­
tion, and remedy guidelines provided by Sa/fi, Eldridge, Diaz, and 
Yamasaki that the district court had ignored in assessing the plaintiffs' 
likelihood of success. Because the Secretary merely asked for a stay of 
the part of the injunction which required her to pay interim benefits, 
the only issue before the court was whether those benefits would be 
paid to former recipients terminated under guidelines that had been 
ruled illega1.98 Judge Reinhardt, speaking for a unanimous three judge 
panel, refused to stay that part of the injunction.99 The appeals court 
applied the same standard the district court had used in granting the 
preliminary injunction to determine if a stay should be granted. 100 The 
court also stated that under the circumstances it could reverse a lower 
court order only if it were clearly erroneous or if the judge had abused 
94. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Ringer v. Schweicker, 697 F.2d at 1295 (9th 
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2013 (1984». 
95. 	 Id. 
96. Outside of tax cases, this author has not encountered a single Supreme Court 
reference to the doctrine of nonacquiescence. 
97. See. e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marhsall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir. 
1980); ITT World Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College 
v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1980), eert denied. 449 U.S. 975 (1980). 
98. 	 Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435. 
99. 	 Id. at 1440. 
100. Id. at 1435. The court applied "two interrelated legal tests." On the one hand, 
movants must establish "a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irrepa­
rable injury" while, on the other hand, they raise "serious legal questions" and demonstrate 
"that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Id. 
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his discretion. 101 The appellate court retraced each step of the balanc­
ing process articulated by the district court.102 It paid greater attention 
to the burden the government bore in paying interim benefits but con­
cluded that the balance still overwhelmingly favored the plaintiffs. 103 
The court determined that the defendant's nonacquiescence pos­
ture had little likelihood of success. 104 Nonacquiescence was unconsti­
tutional: even if it were not, any agency decision not grounded upon 
the Patti and Finnegan guidelines would be "rejected summarily 
whenever challenged in this circuit."105 The court saw "little chance 
that the Secretary will convince this Court to the contrary."106 With 
regard to the issue, therefore, the plaintiff had demonstrated a likeli­
hood of success and had raised serious legal questions. 107 
In her request for a stay, the Secretary contended that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction over the claims of all certified class 
members. lOS Her attack could not be disposed of easily. The Secretary 
claimed that neither the nonwaivable presentation of a claim require­
ment nor the waivable exhaustion of administrative remedies require­
ment had been satisfied by all class members. 109 The appellate court 
101. Id. at 1436 (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. National Foot­
ball League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). 
102. Id. at 1432-36. 
103. Id. at 1436-38. In discussing the government's burden the court found that "the 
physical and emotional suffering shown by plaintiffs in the record before us is far more 
compelling than the possibility of some administrative inconvenience or monetary loss to 
the government."Id. at 1437. The kind of harm caused by the terminations, including pos­
sible death, would be irreparable and not susceptible to retroactive relief. Id. The court 
found that the public interest also commanded the injunction: "The government must be 
concerned not just with the public fisc but with the public weal. . . . Our society as a 
whole suffers when we neglect the poor, the hungry, the disabled or when we deprive them 
of their rights and privileges." Id. 
104. Id. at 1438. 
105. Id. at 1438 & n.8. The court may not be saying that all nonacquiescence is 
unconstitutional but rather that this nonacquiscence is. Unfortunately, the court provides 
no clue as to why some nonacquiescence actions might be acceptable. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1438. The court appears to be applying the same standard that the dis­
trict court did. This apparently contradicts its earlier statement that it would apply the 
same standard as the district court did and only overrule the district court judge if he had 
abused his discretion in making his decision. Id. at 1436. 
108. Id. at 1438. The court discussed the possibility that mandamus jurisdiction 
might also be available to the plaintiffs: "We have recently held that section 1361 [manda­
mus) offers 'an independly adequate ground for jurisdiction' in a case dealing with a 'consti­
tutional challenge' to the illegal termination of social security disability insurance benefits." 
Id. at 1438 n.9 (quoting Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1983». The 
future of this alternative jurisdictional vehicle before the Supreme Court is uncertain and is 
beyond the scope of this note. 
109. Id. at 1439. 
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found that the nonwaivable requirement had been satisfied because: (1) 
recipients had been receiving benefits when they were terminated; and 
(2) the Secretary had had an opportunity to reinstate them. 11O The 
court found support for its analysis in a decision from another cir­
cuit. 111 The court's reliance on another circuit is curious in light of the 
more direct support provided by Eldridge v. Mathews. 112 In Eldridge, 
the claimants fulfilled the prerequisite by taking action similar to that 
of the Lopez plaintiffs. 1I3 Lopez and Eldridge were, thus, analogous 
challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative procedure. 114 
Despite the failure of the court of appeals to rely on it, Eldridge 
plainly authorized its conclusion in Lopez that the nonwaivable ele­
ment of jurisdiction had been satisfied. 
The court found several grounds on which to premise its finding 
that the waivable requirements had also been met. 1I5 First, the refine­
ment of Salfi by Eldridge supported the district court's conclusions: 
"It would have been futile to require plaintiffs to pursue administrative 
remedies in the face of the Secretary's announced policy of nonacqui­
escence."116 The court excused exhaustion of administrative remedies 
under the circumstances. 1I7 Second, the plaintiffs made a constitu­
tional attack on the Secretary's nonacquiescence. liS The Secretary had 
made up her mind and was unlikely to consider substantial changes 
"at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional chal­
lenge in an adjudicatory context."119 The court, therefore, excused ex­
haustion of administrative remedies. 120 Finally, even if the claim had 
been statutory rather than constitutional the court excused exhaustion 
because the Secretary had taken a final position with regard to proce­
dures for redetermining eligibility.121 
The Secretary argued that many class members had not met the 
110. Id. 
Ill. Id. (citing Ellison v. Califano, 546 F.2d 1162, 1164 (5th Cir. 1977». In Ellison 
a benefits claimant asserted the unconstitutionality of an administrative rule that caused a 
couple who had separated to be treated as married for six months after the separation. The 
appellate court found that under these circumstances exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was not required. Ellison, 546 F.2d at 1164. 
112. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
113. Id. at 329. See infra note 181 for explanation of the procedure. 
114. See supra notes 19-24, 58-64 and accompanying text. 
115. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1440. 
119. Id. at 1439 (quoting Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330). 
120. Id. at 1439-40. 
121. Id. 
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statutory requirement of appealing the agency's termination finding 
within sixty days.122 Ordinarily, failure to make a timely appeal 
would render the initial judgment res judicata as to future proceed­
ings. Judge Reinhardt cited language in Salfi and Eldridge that the 
court would deem a res judicata claim waived if not reopened by the 
agency.123 Even though the barren record in Lopez suggested a 
waiver, Judge Reinhardt rejected the Secretary's reliance on adminis­
trative res judicata. 124 He based his rejection on a Supreme Court dic­
tum to the effect that "the administrative res judicata bar is ordinarily 
not applied when an agency's decision is challenged on constitutional 
grounds."125 A close reading of Califano v. Sanders,126 the quoted de­
cision, however, reveals that the court referred to the agency decision 
to waive the statute of limitations not the decision to terminate the 
plaintiff. 127 No claim was made in Lopez that the Secretary unconsti­
tutionally applied administrative res judicata. An administrative bar of 
an untimely claim would normally not be reversible even if, as in Lo­
pez, the underlying claim for benefits was based on the Constitution. 128 
The circuit court's application of Sanders to the Lopez claim, there­
fore, was inappropriate. 
The appellate court then took pains to distinguish a recent court 
of appeals holding. In Smith v. Schweiker129 the Second Circuit re­
versed a district court's finding that it had jurisdiction in a termination 
class action case. 130 The plaintiffs in Smith, as well as those in Lopez, 
argued that procedures such as those mandated by Patti and Finnegan 
had not been followed. l3l The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lo­
pez distinguished Smith because no constitutional question had been 
raised and none of the named plaintiffs had exhausted their adminis­
trative remedies.132 The Lopez court found, therefore, that, while the 
Secretary "may have raised 'serious legal questions', she ha[d] failed to 
make a showing of probability of success on the merits."133 
122. Id. at 1440. 
123. Id. The Court in Eldridge stated: "These two requirements specify a statute of 
limitations and appropriate venue, and are waivable by the parties." 424 U.S. at 328 n.9. 
124. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440. 
125. [d. (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977». 
126. 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
127. Id. at 109. 
128. [d. at 108. 
129. 709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1983). 
130. Id. at 781. 
131. Id. at 779. 
132. 713 F.2d at 1440. 
133. Id. Judge Pregerson stated in a concurrence: 
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C. 	 Justice Rehnquist Grants a Stay in His Capacity as Circuit 
Justice for the Ninth Circuit 
Within days, Circuit Justice Rehnquist temporarily stayed the 
implementation of part of the injunction so the court could consider 
the appeal. 134 He found that the Secretary's request required staying 
"the portion. . . which requires her to pay benefits to all applicants 
until she establishes their lack of disability through hearings comply­
ing with Patti and Finnegan."135 He found three guidelines by which 
to make the decision: (1) whether four justices would vote to grant 
certiorari; (2) whether the "stay equities" would tip in the plaintiffs or 
defendant's favor; and (3) what the final outcome of the claim would 
likely be. 136 He noted that petitioners ordinarily ask for a stay only so 
they can be given time to ask the Court for certiorari .137 Justice Rehn­
quist found, however, that the unusual circumstances that gave rise to 
the Lopez petition enabled him to stay a district court injunction so 
that an appeal could be made to a circuit court. 138 
Circuit Justice Rehnquist first attacked the scope of the districts 
court's order. 139 He acknowledged that four Justices would be unlikely 
to grant certiorari on the propriety of the Patti and Finnegan guide­
lines and that no conflict over these criteria existed among the cir­
cuits. l40 The propriety of the guideline, an issue of statutory 
interpretation, was not the issue. The issue was whether the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rule of law once declared must be applied in 
subsequent cases. The plaintiffs presented a claim which the district 
and circuit courts denominated constitutional. Justice Rehnquist, on 
the other hand, expressed himself troubled by the injunction's 
"mandatory nature, its treatment of. . . exhaustion of administrative 
I concur completely in Judge Reinhardt's opinion. I write separately only to 
emphasize my concern over the Secretary's avowed policy of nonacquiescence 
with Ninth Circuit law as enunciated in Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 
1982), and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). The Secretary's 
ill-advised policy of refusing to obey the decisional law of this circuit is akin to the 
repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification whereby rebellious states re­
fused 	to . . . recognize certain federal laws within their boundaries. . . . The 
government expects its citizens to abide by the law - no less is expected of those 
charged with the duty to faithfully administer the law. 
Id. at 	1441. 
134. 	 Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
135. 	 Id. at 12. 
136. 	 Id. 
137. 	 Id. 
138. 	 Id. a~ 13-16. 
139. 	 Id. at 13-14. 
140. 	 Id. at 12. 
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remedies. . and its direction to the Secretary to pay benefits on an 
interim basis to parties who have neither been found by the Secretary 
nor by a court of competent jurisdiction to be disabled."141 He found 
that such an injunction "significantly interferes with the distribution 
between administrative and judicial responsibility for enforcement of 
the Social Security ACt."142 He argued that the seriousness of the 
legal questions meant that he did not have to consider the stay 
equities. 143 
Circuit Justice Rehnquist used two guidelines in his analysis: first, 
the teaching of Salji required the exhaustion of administrative reme­
dies; and, secondly, FPC v. Transcontinental Pipeline Corp. 144 required 
that the scope of judicial review of such administrative determinations 
be narrow. 145 Notwithstanding his concession that the propriety of the 
administrative guidelines was not the issue, he appears to be saying 
that courts should not interfere with the administrative process. He 
found that a court would need strong grounds for "determining that 
additional evidence is requisite for adequate review ... [and that it 
could not] proceed by dictating to the agency the methods, procedures 
and the time dimension of the needed inquiry."146 The reasoning 
would especially hold true when the only action any class member has 
to take to force the government to pay would be to assert "his subjec­
tive belief [that] his medical condition has not improved since the ear­
lier determination."147 The analysis makes sense if the issue is the 
propriety of the termination guidelines. If the issue is nonacquies­
cence, however, the analysis is irrelevant. Justice Rehnquist's analysis 
bore on whether the termination guidelines were proper not on 
whether a circuit court's finding that they were not should have been 
followed. 
Justice Rehnquist next scrutinized the issue of exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies. He found that some class members had not met 
the nonwaivable requirement of presenting a claim for benefits and 
that other class members had failed to meet the waivable requirement 
of exhausting their administrative remedies. 148 He held that, under 




144. 423 u.s. 326 (1976). 
145. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 12 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
146. Id. (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333, 
(1976». 
147. Id. at 14. 
148. Id. 
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trative remedies would be futile l49 and in doing so, he ignored the sub­
sequent softening of the language in Eldridge. 150 He admitted that the 
appellate court's decision in Ringer excused exhaustion if the Secre­
tary had taken a "final position,"151 but he pointed out that certiorari 
had been granted in Ringer to review that holding. 152 Because of these 
conclusions, only the constitutional nature of the claim remained to 
justify the waiver of the waivable requirement. 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Eldridge excused exhaus­
tion when a constitutional claim was made, but stated that the Lopez 
claim did not necessarily meet this requirement merely by being la­
beled "constitutional."153 He found that the Secretary's failure to pro­
vide predetermination hearings in Eldridge raised a constitutional 
question while the claim in Lopez only concerned an insufficient evi­
dentiary showing and was, therefore, not constitutional in nature. 154 
He could draw this distinction only because he ignored the nonacqui­
escence claim of the plaintiffs. 
Justice Rehnquist found the mandatory nature of the circuit 
court's injunction objectionable. 155 Arguably, that class members 
either still were or previously had been receiving benefits showed that 
they sought a prohibitory (which would maintain the status quo), 
rather than mandatory (which would command new action) injunc­
tion. He found that because of the injunction'S mandating nature, the 
court's power to grant relief did not extend to plaintiffs. 156 He noted 
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Heckler v. Day l57 to re­
view a lower court order that the Solicitor General pay interim bene­
fits to all class claimants while the Secretary made an initial 
determination of their eligibility. 158 Justice Rehnquist argued that Lo­
pez presented an analogous situationl59 but neglected to mention that 
the claimants in Day, unlike those in Lopez had not previously been 
collecting benefits.l60 
Justice Rehnquist accepted the lower court's finding that the eq­
149. Id. 
ISO. 424 U.S. at 328. 

lSI. 697 F.2d at 1295, rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984). 

152. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 14-15. 
153. Id. at 14. 
154. Id. at IS. 

ISS. Id. at 12. 

156. Id. at IS. 
157. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983). 
158. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 21. 
159. Id. at IS. 
160. Id. But see Day, 685 F.2d at 21. 
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uities favored the plaintiffs. 161 He stated that the manner in which the 
district court sought to remedy the situation caused him to stay the 
injunction. 162 In other words, relief for individuals who had been ter­
minated would be appropriate if they had presented a claim and ex­
hausted their administrative remedies163 but class wide injunction 
relief would be too intrusive an action for a district court to take un­
less all class members met strict jurisdictional requirements. l64 These 
considerations apparently overwhelmed the merits of the nonacquies­
cence claim. They left, however, hundreds of thousands of eligible in­
dividuals, whose nonacquiescence claim would never be reviewed, 
without benefits. 
D. The Supreme Court Affirms the Stay 
Despite this glaring problem, five Justices denied, without com­
ment, the plaintiffs' application to vacate Justice Rehnquist's stay.165 
Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Blackmun in his partial dis­
sent. 166 Justice Stevens noted that some class members had received a 
final determination and had sought judicial review within sixty 
days.167 The stay, he urged, should not have applied to them. 168 He 
maintained that these members had satisfied both the waivable and the 
nonwaivable prerequisites because, after termination, they each had 
returned a questionnaire in which they had claimed continued disabil­
ity.169 This action, in addition to the fact that "their benefits had been 




165. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. 221, 222 (1983). Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, 
White and Powell joined in Justce Rehnquist's majority opinion. 
166. Id. at 221-25, (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
169. Id.; see Appellees-Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Appli­
cation to Vacate Stay at \0 n.11, Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S.Ct. \0 (Rechquist, Circuit Justice 
1983). The steps a claimant takes are as follows: 
The procedure starts with the recipient's completion of a questionnaire 
which asks, among other things, whether the recipient or the treating physician 
believes the recipient can work. . . . Following the state agency's review process, 
a tentative determination letter is sent with an invitation to submit additional 
evidence if available prior to the final determination. The notice terminating disa­
bility benefits, if any, follows final review of the case, including any additional 
evidence. . . . The only recent change is the requirement of a face-to-face inter­
view with the recipient at the local Social Security district office at which time the 
Social Security worker assists the recipient complete a questionnaire. 
Id. 
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terminated on the basis of a regulation that [was] assumed for the pur­
poses of this proceeding to be invalid,"170 satisfied the non-waivable 
requirement. l7l Plaintiffs had met the waivable precondition because 
the Secretary had taken a final position and, therefore, further admin­
istrative appeals would have been futile. 172 Under these circumstances, 
Justice Stevens reasoned, the Court in Diaz had found that "this ele­
ment may be deemed waived even over the Secretary's objections."173 
Justice Stevens felt it made no difference whether the claim were con­
stitutional or not. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented. 174 They stated that 
the equities so strongly favored the plaintiffs that regardless of ques­
tionable legal issues the stay should have been vacated.17S Justice 
Brennan noted that if the full Court were considering the injunction 
rather than the stay, he might have agreed with most of Justice Ste­
vens's analysis, but he did not believe it was presently necessary "to 
provide further support for the conclusion reached by the Court of 
Appeals," 176 particularly because the appellate court's opinion 
"clearly explained why the beneficiaries. . . satisfied the jurisdictional 
requirements of 42 U.S.c. §§ 405(g) and ... (h)."177 Brennan was 
the only Justice to mention nonacquiescence: "[I]t is the Secretary 
who has not paid due respect to a coordinate branch of government 
[by] expressly refusing to implement the binding decision of the Ninth 
Circuit." 178 
III. ANALYSIS 
The issues presented in Lopez have produced multifaceted and 
often contradictory judicial responses. 179 All judges who have consid­
ered the nonacquiescence claim, however, appear to agree that it has 
merit. 180 Justice Rehnquist's decision to review the injunction in­
dependent of the merits of the nonacquiescence claiml81 is one critical 
170. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
172. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Diaz, 426 U.S. at 75-77). 
174. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 225 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
175. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
177. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 226-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
179. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440. But see 104 S.Ct. at 221. 
180. Lopez, 713 F.2d. at 1436; Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 14 (Circuit Justice Rehnquist ac­
cepted for the purposes of this motion that the claim had merit). Lopez, 104 S.Ct at 223, 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
181. 104 S.Ct. at 12. 
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element that sets Justice Rehnquist and the four Justices l82 who, in 
Lopez, supported his stay apart from the remaining Justices and judges 
who have issued rulings in this case. The refusal to consider the merits 
of the nonacquiescence claim is neither legally nor logically sound. 
Schmidt v. Lessard l83 provides the sole source of authority for not bal­
ancing the equities among the litigants. Under a balancing theory the 
choice lies between the excess cost the government would incur when 
individuals who should not be collecting benefits receive them and the 
harm termination might visit on those who are cut off unjustly because 
of the government's nonacquiescence. 184 In Schmidt, a court granted 
injunctive relief to a class of individuals over eighteen years old invol­
untarily committed to mental institutions in Wisconsin. 18s The injunc­
tion did not specify the form of relief mandated. 186 The defendant 
could not determine how to comply; therefore, the injunction violated 
the specificity requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 187 
The Lopez injunction is specific. 188 The problem presented by Schmidt, 
therefore, is not applicable in these circumstances. Perhaps Justice 
Rehnquist meant that Schmidt stands for the broader proposition that 
injunctions could generally be scrutinized without reaching the merits 
of the claim. This theory draws no support from the short Schmidt 
opinion which focused only on the importance of specificity in an in­
junction. 189 The opinion gives no hint of any broader pretentions. 
Moreover, when the mandate of an injunction is arguably unclear, one 
questions the sufficiency of the clarity of its contents not why it was 
issued. 190 If the mandate is clear, however, then the scrutiny should 
focus on the legal merits of that mandate. 
Justice Rehnquist also considered it significant that the injunction 
required the Secretary to initiate monetary payments. 191 His distinc­
182. See supra note 177. 
183. 414 U.S. 473 (1974). 
184. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1436. 
185. 414 U.S. at 473-74. 
186. Id. at 476. 
187. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. Rule 65 in relevant part provides: "Every order granting 
an injunction. . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in tenns; shall 
describe in reasonable detail; and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the 
act or acts sought to be restrained." Id. 
188. See supra note 12. 
189. 414 U.S. at 473-77. 
190. Id. at 477. The precise language of the Court is; "[W]e can hardly begin to 
assess the correctness of the judgment entered by the district court here without knowing 
its precise bounds." Id. 
191. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 13. 
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tion between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions192 implies that he 
might accept an order that required the Secretary to keep paying 
rather than to start paying benefits. He cited Heckler v. Day 193 for the 
proposition that the Court frowns on an injunction that requires the 
payment of interim benefits in similar circumstances. 194 The plaintiffs 
in Lopez, however, had been receiving benefits prior to their term ina­
tions195 while the plaintiffs in Day had never received benefits. 196 The 
circumstances of the two cases are, therefore, significantly different. 
Thus, the distinction between a prohibitory and a mandatory injunc­
tion breaks down. 
For the purposes of the motion to stay, Justice Rehnquist ac­
cepted that all members of the class had once been judged disabled by 
a government agency and subsequently illegally terminated without 
the production of new evidence. 197 He faulted the district court's in­
junction, however, because it allowed only the recipients' "subjective 
belief' to entitle them to injunctive remedy.198 Justice Rehnquist ap­
parently considered only the period after termination and, thus, ig­
nored the totality of the circumstances. Most fundamentally, he 
disregarded the fact that the Secretary's basis for termination was an 
evidenciary standard previously held illegal by the court of appeals. 
Justices Stevens and Brennan and the lower court judges share 
the virtue of permitting the plaintiffs nonacquiescence claim to be ad­
dressed. 199 Despite their difference all appear to have been affected by 
the equitable strength of the plaintiffs position. Perhaps this accounts 
for their willingness to inquire into the merits of the nonacquiescence 
claim. But in order to reach the merits these judges had to dispose of 
the Salfi problems raised by Justice Rehnquist. Recall that Justice 
Rehnquist's analysis grappled primarily with three questions: (1) 
whether the plaintiffs presented claims for benefits (2) whether the na­
ture of their claims was such that the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies could be excused and (3) whether the sixty day statute of 
192. Id. A mandatory injunction is one that orders the start of some activity. A 
prohibitory injunction is one that commands the maintainance of the status quo. Id. 
193. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cm. granted, 103 S.Ct. 1873, vacated, 104 S. Ct. 
2249 (1984). 
194. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 15. 
195. 713 F.2d at 1434. 
196. 685 F.2d. at 21. 
197. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 15. 
198. Id. at 14. 
199. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting), Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 227 (Bren­
nan, J., dissenting). 
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limitation requirement applied to members of the class.20<Yfhe remain­
der of this note will sketch a different approach to these questions, one 
that is sensitive to the separation of powers concerns of Salfi without 
allowing these concerns to frustrate judicial review of the important 
issue of agency non-acquiescence. 
A. Claim for Benefits: The Nonwaivable Element 
Ellison v. Califano201 arguably provides support for the appellate 
court's finding that the nonwaivable claim for benefits requirement 
had been met.202 In Ellison, the court said: "In the context of this case, 
a claim for benefits was presented to the Secretary automatically when 
the SSI recipient reported a separation from an eligible spouse."203 
The Supreme Court has never approved an "automatic" claim the­
ory.204 Because Ellison represented a challenge to the constitutionality 
of a statute and Lopez a challenge to the constitutionality of a proce­
dure, the latter arguably does not arise in the context to which the 
Ellison court limited its holding. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
could have found stronger support for its position from Eldridge. Both 
Eldridge and Lopez challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's 
procedures.2os The Eldridge Court found that the plaintiff's response 
to a questionnaire sent out to recipients by the Secretary satisfied the 
nonwaivable request for benefits requirement.206 The plaintiffs in Lo­
pez filled out an almost equivalent questionnaire.207 Thus, Eldridge 
rather than Ellison provided the appellate court with stronger grounds 
for finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the nonwaivable request for 
benefits prerequisite. 
Justice Stevens, in partial dissent to Lopez, relied on Eldridge, not 
Ellison.20s Justice Powell, the author of the Eldridge opinion, sup­
ported Justice Rehnquist's stay.209 This may reflect a change of posi­
tion on Justice Powell's part or he may have merely been deferring to 
200. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 104 S.Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), 
stay affirmed, 104 S.Ct. 221 (1983). Justice Rehnquist does not reach the statute of limita­
tion issue in granting the stay, 104 S.Ct. at 10-15. Justice Stevens does not explicitly say a 
class action is appropriate but it is implied in his decision. See id. at 221-25 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
201. 546 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1977). 
202. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
203. 546 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis in the original). 
204. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 14 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983). 
205. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
206. 424 U.S. at 332. 
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
208. 104 S.Ct. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. at 221. 
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the Circuit Justice's opinion in granting the Lopez stay. In either case, 
the theory of Lopez is that a recipient has to do more than fill out a 
questionnaire stating that he/she is still entitled to benefits. 
This result is not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pre­
vious holding in Eldridge, it is wholly impractical. The district court 
noted that many Lopez litigants would have trouble protecting their 
rights because of their disabilities.210 It is reasonable to assume that 
many would do no more than fill out the questionnaire. Apparently, 
under the majority view, they would be unsuccessful if they later 
fought the termination of their benefits. Nonacquiescence, therefore, 
coupled with the Supreme Court's ruling in Lopez, might severely 
limit the number of eligible individuals who eventually would have 
their benefits reinstated. If the use of nonacquiescence effectively 
reduces the total number of recipients, a desire to cut costs could re­
sult in its repeated use. 
The manner in which benefit termination occurs may also lower 
the percentage of recipients who meet the request for benefits con­
straint. If the department informs individuals that new evidence com­
pels the cessation of their benefits, they are likely to contest evidence 
they think is false. The same individuals, told that a procedural change 
in the way evidence is considered will result in a benefit termination, 
may fail to act. A procedural change is external to the claimant. The 
individual may feel powerless to act because the change has nothing to 
do with the person's condition. When procedural changes bring about 
termination, therefore, demanding more than a response to the ques­
tionnaire will further limit the scope of the certified class. Deserving 
individuals may lose their benefits. 
B. Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies: the Waivable Element 
The class would be further constricted if the standard required 
exhaustion of administrative remedies as to all class members. The 
majority who supported Justice Rehnquist's stay may not still agree211 
with the language of Salfi212 that the Secretary had the sole discretion 
to determine when further appeals would be futile. 213 This interpreta­
tion may possibly revitalize this power of the Secretary. As noted in 
the introduction to this note, the Court appeared to retreat from the 
210. Lopez, 572 F.Supp. at 31. 
211. See Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 221. 
212. 422 U.S. at 749 (1975). 
213. Id. at 766. 
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conclusion in Eldridge:214 "A claimant's interest to have a particular 
issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judg­
ment is inappropriate."2Is The judiciary need not defer if further ad­
ministrative action could not possibly settle the claim. The Lopez 
plaintiffs' challenge to the Secretary's nonacquiescence could not pos­
sibly have been settled through further administrative appeals because 
the Secretary had directed her administrative law judges not to acqui­
esce in the Pattj216 and Finnegan217 holdings. The language of El­
dridge rather than the language of Salfi should govern the Lopez 
claim. 
Justice Stevens might have been seeking a middle ground.2ls He 
approved an award of interim benefits, but on a statutory rather than a 
constitutional basis.219 In other words, if the Secretary's procedural 
instructions render further appeals futile, then even if the Secretary's 
action raises no constitutional issue, she has taken a final position. 
Once the Secretary has taken a final position, the Supreme Court's 
Diaz220 decision excuses further administrative appeals.221 Professor 
Goldstein has argued that the court held that "[a]s to the waivable 
element, the Court held that a final decision had been made within the 
meaning of Section 405(g) despite the secretary's protestation to the 
contrary since he had conceded the absence of factual issues and that 
the applications had or would be denied because of the challenged 
statutory provisions. "222 
Unlike Lopez, however, Diaz concerned a constitutional challenge 
to a statute not to the implementation of new regulations for carrying 
out an unchallenged statute.223 Professor Goldstein acknowledges, 
however, that "it can be argued that the final decision requirement 
should be approached differently when legal issues arise out of the reg­
ulations. . . [M]uch more deference should be accorded the Secretary 
when the legality of regulations is at issue."224 The distinction between 
an attack on the Secretary's procedures and a substantive constitu­
tional challenge to a statute argues against the application of the Diaz 
214. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 

215.. Id. at 330. 

216. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982). 
217. 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). 
218. 104 S.Ct. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
219. Id. at 223. 
220. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
221. Id. at 70. 
222. Sa/fi Revisited, supra note 48, at 729-30. 
223. See supra notes 69-75. 
224. Sa/fi Revisited, supra note 48, at 730. 
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holding to Lopez. Again, the holding of Eldridge excusing further fu­
tile administrative action appears more appropriate, because Eldridge 
and Lopez are both attacks on the constitutionality of procedures 
adopted by the Secretary. 
Perhaps Justice Stevens relied on Diaz rather than Eldridge to 
support his dissent to the Lopez stay. If he could convince Justice 
Powell that his stance corresponds more consistently with one of Pow­
ell's earlier decisions,225 Justice Stevens might garner the fifth vote he 
needs to support his position. Because Justice Powell was the author of 
the Eldridge decision,226 however, he may be more likely to apply El­
dridge rather than Diaz to an analogous situation. 
Even if the basis for the Lopez claim were merely statutory, the 
Court should still reach the merits of the Secretary's policy of nonac­
quiescence. If the court decides in the claimant's favor, it would read 
the Social Security Act to require the Secretary to follow its interpre­
tation of particular provisions of that act. Both Eldridge and Justice 
Stevens' interpretation of Diaz, thus, authorize the Court to address 
the legality of the policy of the Secretary that gave rise to the nonac­
quiescence claim, whether as a statutory claim or a constitutional 
matter. By utilizing statutory rather than constitutional analysis, Jus­
tice Stevens hurdles Salfi and addresses nonacquiescence. 
In Lopez, the district227 and appellate228 courts concluded that 
plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim.229 According to Justice Ste­
vens, they might have succeded with merely a statutory challenge: ap­
perently, however, they presented a constitutional claim. They did not 
necessarily say, "We are entitled to benefits," but rather, "We are enti­
tled to have our benefits reviewed according to rules of law mandated 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." The plaintiffs charged that 
the Secretary unconstitutionally refused to acquiesce in this rule of law 
and that she therefore denied them due process and violated separa­
tion of powers by terminating their benefits.230 The district court de­
termined only that the Lopez claimants were entitled to benefits until 
their cases could be screened under the Patti and Finnegan criteria: if 
the agency "conclude[s] that such person's medical condition has im­
225. Justice Powell is the author of the Eldridge decision. The actions of the plain­
tiffs in Lopez are virtually equivalent to the actions of the plaintiffs in Eldridge. See supra 
note 185 and accompanying text. 
226. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319. 
227. 572 F. Supp. at 29-30. 
228. 713 F.2d at 1432 (1983). 
229. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
230. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 28. 
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proved and he or she is no longer disabled, [it] will identify the evi­
dence relied upon to reach the conclusion."231 Even if sufficient 
evidence were presented, therefore, class members might still be termi­
nated. Perhaps the Supreme Court remains reluctant to screen evi­
dence presented at administrative hearings. A difference exists, 
however, between scrutinizing the rules of evidence and reviewing the 
evidence itself. If the Secretary can employ illegal evidentiary rules, 
she accrues broad powers to immunize her activities from judicial re­
view. Such rules can be applied to many statutes. The Lopez stay sug­
gests that the Supreme Court is willing to examine only the outcome 
produced by such rules in particular individual cases, thus effectively 
leaving the rules of evidence themselves free from judicial scrutiny. 
The Court serves neither the spirit nor the substance of the Constitu­
tion by this approach. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
If a claimant does not appeal the Secretary's final decision in sixty 
days to the district court, the ruling is res judicata in all subsequent 
claims.232 Yet the class the district court certified included individuals 
who had not made a timely appea1.233 ·The court of appeals concluded 
that the Supreme Court in Salfi234 and Eldridge235 had determined 
that the statute of limitations was "waivable by the parties and not 
having been timely raised below ... need not be considered here."236 
The court of appeals cited a second ground to deem the requirement 
waived: "In any event the administrative res judicata bar is ordinarily 
not applied when the agency's decision is challenged on constitutional 
grounds."237 Justice Rehnquist did not discuss this issue in his stay 
order, but Justice Stevens correctly rejected the argument.238 A court 
may review constitutional challenge to the agency's decision to apply 
the sixty day statute of limitations.239 A court may not review the ap­
plication of the statute of limitations, however, just because the under­
lying claim against the Secretary is constitutional in nature. 
In Califano v. Sanders, the Court implied that a constitutional 
231. Id. at 32. 
232. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440. 
233. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 31-32. See also Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 222 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
234. 422 U.S. at 763-64. 
235. 424 U.S. at 328 n.9. 
236. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440. 
237. Id. 
238. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 224 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
239. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). 
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challenge to the application of the sixty day statute of limitations 
would be justiciable.240 The plaintiffs might make a stronger claim if 
they were to maintain that claimants were not likely to know that they 
could appeal a change in administrative procedure.241 Claimants 
might assert that the Secretary had given them insufficient notice 
under the circumstances. While the fate of the argument before the 
Supreme Court is uncertain, it would more closely meet the review­
ability requirements of Sanders. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The heart of the problem for the Lopez litigants is the Court's 
refusal to acknowledge the constitutional issue of nonacquiescence. 
The Court's reluctance may reflect the complex political setting in 
which the doctrine is employed.242 The Supreme Court may also fear 
that courts would unnecessarily encumber agencies by dictating proce­
dures. The Court's hesitancy is understandable, but as a result hun­
dreds of thousands of Lopez v. Heckler claimants, none found 
ineligible under the applicable Social Security Act standards set out in 
Patti and Finnegan, remain without the support many of them need to 
survive. Furthermore, the Court's refusal to reach the issue encour­
ages nonacquiescence, thus making an ultimate confrontation more 
likely. 
Whether there can be judicial review of the Secretary's policy of 
240. Id. 
241. This, in effect, is making a constitutional argument of improper notice. 
242. Outside the tax arena the doctrine of nonacquiescence was articulated by the 
National Labor Relations Board as early as 1953. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 
204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953). The court rejected its validity, id. at 533, but the case was not 
appealed. The position of the NLRB was that only the Supreme Court could alter its rul­
ings. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the NLRB's repeated resort to this 
tactic illegal: "[O]ur judgments. . . are binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the 
. . . district, and also on administrative agencies. . . . For the board to predicate an order 
on its disagreements with this court's interpretation of a statue is for it to operate outside 
the law." Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs 
in the above two cases were companies appealing what they considered to be pro-union 
decisions. In Lopez, the agency arguably is using nonacquiescence as a sword to terminate 
the rights of those it is charged with protecting. In the NLRB setting, the agency used the 
doctrine to shield the rights of those in its charge. A determination of the constitutionality 
of nonacquiescence would have farreaching effects because it might affect the functioning of 
many administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue 
Service, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection 
Agency to name a few. 
A full discussion of the history of nonacquiesence in an NLRB setting is contained in 
Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: 'Stare Decisis' Only Applies If 
The Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. BAR. J. 2561 (1982). 
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nonacquiescence is the fundamental issue presented by Lopez. If Patti 
and Finnegan had been followed, none of the Lopez plaintiffs would 
have lost benefits as a result of the application of illegal standards. 
The first circuit-wide determination that the agency had employed 
such standards would redound to the benefit of all claimants. When 
nonacquiescence is added, however, the result of the first claimant's 
case would have no effect on other claimants. The difference argues 
for broad class-wide relief, but instead the Court has applied jurisdic­
tional barriers that limit class membership.243 The result "represent[s] 
a classic elevation of form over substance."244 
Robert Meeropol 
243. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983). 
244. Appellees-Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Application to 
Vacate Stay at 11, Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S. Ct. 10 (1983). 
